Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0364-2zbMath1190.91114OpenAlexW2065062696MaRDI QIDQ836923

Ayşe Mumcu, Ismail Saglam

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9239/1/MPRA_paper_9239.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching

Cites Work

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