The NIP graph of a social welfare function

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0367-7zbMath1190.91059OpenAlexW2081467111MaRDI QIDQ836926

Robert C. Powers, Lee R. Gibson

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0367-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Extremal problems in graph theory (05C35) Applications of graph theory (05C90) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (1)

Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Edges in graphs with large girth
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Nondictatorially independent pairs
• Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto
• Extremal graphs without three‐cycles or four‐cycles
• On the structure of extremal graphs of high girth
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

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