Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0374-8zbMath1190.91043OpenAlexW2074130938MaRDI QIDQ836932

Pedro Rey-Biel, Miguel Ángel Ballester

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0374-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting ⋮ What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?

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