The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game

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Publication:838143

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004zbMath1168.91331OpenAlexW2018136046WikidataQ59818493 ScholiaQ59818493MaRDI QIDQ838143

Marios Mavronicolas, Elias Koutsoupias, Dimitris Fotakis, Paul G. Spirakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis

Publication date: 21 August 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004




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