Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0055-6zbMath1195.91052OpenAlexW2096441769MaRDI QIDQ839608

Kristopher W. Ramsay, Mark Fey

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0055-6

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprivate informationconflictwarwar consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Interim third-party selection in bargaining

Cites Work

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• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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