Power and efficiency in production pillage games

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5zbMath1195.91006OpenAlexW1978772063MaRDI QIDQ839610

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystable setcorecoalitional gameconflictpillagelegitimacy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Pillage games with multiple stable sets ⋮ Stability of alliance networks ⋮ Asymmetric majority pillage games ⋮ Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games

Cites Work

• Pillage and property
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
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