A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0058-3zbMath1195.91051OpenAlexW2130519521MaRDI QIDQ839615

Stefan Brandauer, Florian Englmaier

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1654.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contestspolitical economyrent seekingstrategic delegationarms racesdistributional conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups ⋮ Sharing the effort costs in group contests

Cites Work

• Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Contest success functions
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates