Measuring influence in command games

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0350-8zbMath1190.91017OpenAlexW3125266096MaRDI QIDQ839616

Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0350-8

zbMATH Keywords

power indexShapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexcommand gamescommand influence functionweighted influence index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements ⋮ A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations ⋮ NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST ⋮ Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ Values for Markovian coalition processes ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ Lattices in Social Networks with Influence

Cites Work

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• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• A model of influence in a social network
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.
• On authority distributions in organizations: Controls.
• An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games
• Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
• A theory of decisional power
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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