Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0359-zzbMath1190.91046OpenAlexW2112636404MaRDI QIDQ839624

Christopher R. H. Hanusa

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0359-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Cites Work

• Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
• Millions of election outcomes from a single profile
• How many voters are needed for paradoxes?
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Basic Geometry of Voting

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