Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth
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Publication:839652
DOI10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9zbMath1182.03017OpenAlexW2122067050MaRDI QIDQ839652
Publication date: 2 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9
Related Items (9)
Revision without revision sequences: circular definitions ⋮ Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes ⋮ How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference ⋮ A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX ⋮ Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference ⋮ Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth ⋮ Guest editors' introduction ⋮ Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth ⋮ FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DEPENDENCE AND GROUNDEDNESS
Cites Work
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- Paradox, truth and logic. I. Paradox and truth
- Four valued semantics and the Liar
- Kripke and the logic of truth
- An alternate formulation of Kripke's theory of truth
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference
- Stenius on the paradoxes
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
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