Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.001zbMath1195.91187OpenAlexW2044547121MaRDI QIDQ840681

Huberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister

Publication date: 14 September 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaimplementationprivate informationbank runscorrelated types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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Cites Work

• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

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