Efficient compromising
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Publication:840684
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.011zbMath1195.91032OpenAlexW4230096383MaRDI QIDQ840684
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/31974/1/Postl_J_Economic_Theory_2009_144_5.pdf
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Cites Work
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