A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
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Publication:840688
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.02.003zbMath1195.91050OpenAlexW2128529756MaRDI QIDQ840688
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/1931/1/1931.pdf
ambiguity aversionrevelation principleepsilon contaminationsurplus extractiondynamic mechanismmodified Dutch auction
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