The value of information for auctioneers
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Publication:840693
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.04.002zbMath1195.91056OpenAlexW2009612355MaRDI QIDQ840693
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.002
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
Cites Work
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- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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