Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
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Publication:840816
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2009.02.005zbMath1187.91061OpenAlexW2102219503WikidataQ56114312 ScholiaQ56114312MaRDI QIDQ840816
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.02.005
knowledge representationsocial choice theoryArrow's theoremcomputer-aided theorem provingMuller-Satterthwaite theoremSen's theorem
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Uses Software
Cites Work
- Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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