Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents
DOI10.1007/S10614-008-9150-6zbMath1170.91421OpenAlexW1992479209MaRDI QIDQ842802
Steven O. Kimbrough, Frederic H. Murphy
Publication date: 25 September 2009
Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1215&context=oid_papers
oligopolyCournot competitionlearning in gamesagent-based modelingproduction quantity decision making
Decision theory (91B06) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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