A comparison of first price multi-object auctions

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9189-6zbMath1170.91361OpenAlexW1989321994MaRDI QIDQ842809

Katerina Sherstyuk

Publication date: 25 September 2009

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9189-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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