Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets

DOI10.1007/S10683-008-9195-3zbMATH Open1170.91353OpenAlexW1979899987MaRDI QIDQ842811

Oleg Korenok, Douglas D. Davis, Robert J. Reilly

Publication date: 25 September 2009

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.950.7581

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis
• Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
• Counterintuitive number effects in experimental oligopolies
• Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: An experimental evaluation
• What collusion? Unilateral market power as a catalyst for countercyclical markups
• Cost structures and Nash play in repeated Cournot games
• The effectiveness of low price matching in mitigating the competitive pressure of low friction electronic markets
• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets

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