Optimal auctions and information disclosure

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9zbMath1195.91054OpenAlexW2047624740MaRDI QIDQ843742

Alex Gershkov

Publication date: 15 January 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9

zbMATH Keywords

information structuresoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Sequential information disclosure in auctions ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ Information structures in optimal auctions ⋮ Communication of preferences in contests for contracts

Cites Work

• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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