A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules

DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0094-7zbMath1195.91073OpenAlexW2045914602MaRDI QIDQ843748

P. Luquin, Elena Inarra, Javier Arin

Publication date: 15 January 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0094-7

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolusairport gamesegalitarian allocationNash outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives

Cites Work

• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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