Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality
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Publication:844666
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.06.010zbMath1181.91158OpenAlexW1992582069MaRDI QIDQ844666
Leslie Shiell, Nikita Lyssenko
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sciencessociales.uottawa.ca/economics/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca.economics/files/0409E.pdf
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Economic dynamics (91B55)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model of global warming
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- Community Preference Fields
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