Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.06.014zbMath1181.91095OpenAlexW1999072712MaRDI QIDQ844672

Arthur Hau

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.014

zbMATH Keywords

revelation principleclaim falsificationinexact verificationoptimal indemnity scheduleoptimal insurance contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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