Simple games with many effective voters

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.015zbMath1197.91079OpenAlexW2092008736MaRDI QIDQ844903

Eyal Beigman

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

Ramsey theorysocial choiceindeterminacysimple gamescommittee voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• On the learnability of majority rule
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• The Voting Problem
• A theory of the learnable
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Social Indeterminacy
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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