Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.001zbMath1197.91131OpenAlexW3123120057MaRDI QIDQ844920

Florian Herold

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

trustincomplete contractssignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Delegation Using Forward Induction ⋮ Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust ⋮ The timing of discretionary bonuses -- effort, signals, and reciprocity ⋮ Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

Cites Work

• Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Fairness and Contract Design
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

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