Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.001zbMath1197.91099OpenAlexW2120407819MaRDI QIDQ844921

Maarten C. W. Janssen, Santanu Roy

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

signalingincomplete informationqualityoligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (9)

Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search ⋮ Dynamic pricing, reference price, and price-quality relationship ⋮ Oligopolistic competition in price and quality ⋮ Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly ⋮ Advertising, ecolabeling and consumers' beliefs: greenwashing or not? ⋮ Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality ⋮ Better product quality may lead to lower product price ⋮ Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions

Cites Work

• Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

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