Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
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Publication:844925
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.003zbMath1197.91084OpenAlexW2099532841MaRDI QIDQ844925
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/21320
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (18)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Egalitarianism in the queueing problem ⋮ A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals ⋮ No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines
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