Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules
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Publication:844927
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.07.002zbMath1202.91118OpenAlexW1980696117MaRDI QIDQ844927
Özgür Kıbrıs, Ịpek Gürsel Tapkı
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002
Related Items (5)
Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players ⋮ Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: decomposable rules ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Nash bargaining solution under externalities ⋮ Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism
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