Moral norms in a partly compliant society

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.07.007zbMath1197.91086OpenAlexW2091296248MaRDI QIDQ844929

Sebastian Kranz

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22956

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssocial preferencescomplier optimalitymoral normsrule-utilitarianism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements ⋮ Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Do the reciprocal trust less?
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
• A theory of reciprocity
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism

This page was built for publication: Moral norms in a partly compliant society