Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.05.008zbMath1197.91072OpenAlexW2054338434MaRDI QIDQ844934

Julian Rode

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2307/1/dp08_04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

trustcompetitionasymmetric informationexperimental economicssubjective beliefsautomatic information processingcontext effectstruth telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

DO LIES ERODE TRUST?

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Subjective games and equilibria
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest

This page was built for publication: Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context