On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
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Publication:844941
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010zbMath1197.91135OpenAlexW3123874578MaRDI QIDQ844941
Gwenaël Piaser, Uday Rajan, Eloisa Campioni, Andrea Attar
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010
Related Items (3)
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ Mechanism design of fashion virtual enterprise under monitoring strategy ⋮ Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
Cites Work
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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