The possibility of impossible stairways: tail events and countable player sets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.009zbMath1197.91040OpenAlexW2099624607MaRDI QIDQ844944

Mark Voorneveld

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategiescommon-payoff gamesnonexistence of equilibriumpayoff-dominancetail events

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (6)

Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players ⋮ A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players ⋮ Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept

Cites Work

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• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Group rationality, utilitarianism, and Escher's waterfall
• Potential games
• Non-cooperative games
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Probability with Martingales
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Points for Games with Infinitely Many Players

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