Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.008zbMath1197.91138OpenAlexW2167152832MaRDI QIDQ845010

Debasis Mishra, Adolphus J. J. Talman

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f9e693fb7ad8

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumiterative auctionsassignment modeloverdemanded setunderdemanded set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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