Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.004zbMath1197.91109OpenAlexW1977447130MaRDI QIDQ845011

Benar Fux Svaiter, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2163

zbMATH Keywords

independent private valuesvirtual valuationironingoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity ⋮ A note on the continuity of the optimal auction ⋮ Regulating oligopolistic competition ⋮ Information design in optimal auctions ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
• Monopoly and product quality
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Optimal Auction Design

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