Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.07.002zbMath1197.91028OpenAlexW2069125786MaRDI QIDQ845016

Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

common priors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors

Cites Work

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• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

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