Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
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Publication:845019
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.011zbMath1197.91083OpenAlexW2267374399MaRDI QIDQ845019
François Maniquet, Olivier Bochet
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-43.pdf
Related Items (6)
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
Cites Work
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology.
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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