On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.004zbMath1179.91019OpenAlexW1985088991MaRDI QIDQ845603

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

weak ordershomology groups of simplicial complexesthe Brouwer fixed point theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox

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