Oligarchies in spatial environments

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.006zbMath1179.91063OpenAlexW3022879908MaRDI QIDQ845604

Ton Storcken, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/09-2007-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligarchiesspatial environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

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• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Generalized median social welfare functions
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Social choice with analytic preferences
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

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