An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2009.11.004zbMath1182.91082OpenAlexW2079644996MaRDI QIDQ846484

Kentaro Kojima, Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2009.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

relationscoalitionscooperative gamesgame theorypowerbargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A strict partial order on payoff configurations and its some properties

Cites Work

• The desirability relation of simple games
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• Unnamed Item

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