Why indeterminate probability is rational

DOI10.1016/J.JAL.2009.04.002zbMath1191.03017OpenAlexW1967985219MaRDI QIDQ846519

Isaac Levi

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Journal of Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2009.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

coherenceconvexityconditionalizationirrelevanceconfirmational commitmentconfirmational consistencycredal stateE-admissibilitystate of full belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items (4)

Distention for Sets of Probabilities ⋮ Probabilistic opinion pooling with imprecise probabilities ⋮ Vague credence ⋮ Learning and pooling, pooling and learning

Cites Work

• The logical foundations of statistical inference
• A representation of partially ordered preferences
• Coherent choice functions under uncertainty
• Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
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