Effective contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.09.019zbMath1182.91081OpenAlexW4247247130WikidataQ57933941 ScholiaQ57933941MaRDI QIDQ846617

Todd R. Kaplan, Aner Sela

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.019

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsentry costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach ⋮ Second-price auctions with private entry costs ⋮ Submission costs in risk-taking contests ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests ⋮ Contests with endogenous entry

Cites Work

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contest architecture

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