Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3zbMath1197.91042OpenAlexW1972476146MaRDI QIDQ847804

Theodore L. Turocy

Publication date: 19 February 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3

zbMATH Keywords

quantal responsehomotopy methodscomputing Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (5)

A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games ⋮ Strategic reasoning in \(p\)-beauty contests ⋮ Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making ⋮ Adversarial classification using signaling games with an application to phishing detection ⋮ Proto-coalition bargaining and the core

Uses Software

• Gambit

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence
• Sequential Equilibria
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game

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