Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
From MaRDI portal
Publication:847864
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0403-3zbMath1182.91085OpenAlexW2068992686MaRDI QIDQ847864
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0403-3
Related Items (3)
Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
Cites Work
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Comparative cheap talk
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
This page was built for publication: Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
