A contraction principle for finite global games

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0411-3zbMath1188.91043OpenAlexW2091608359MaRDI QIDQ847869

Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 19 February 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-112102549

zbMATH Keywords

supermodular gameglobal gameequilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (8)

Common belief foundations of global games ⋮ Strategic mistakes ⋮ Speculative attacks with multiple targets ⋮ Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab ⋮ Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities ⋮ Optimal bounds on finding fixed points of contraction mappings ⋮ Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games ⋮ Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bayes theory
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses
• Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

This page was built for publication: A contraction principle for finite global games