Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances

DOI10.1007/S10992-009-9112-ZzbMath1189.03008OpenAlexW1968831112MaRDI QIDQ848215

Paul Elbourne

Publication date: 2 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9112-z

zbMATH Keywords

possible worldssituation semanticsdirect referencepropositions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (3)

Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions ⋮ Propositions, representation, and truth ⋮ Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions

Cites Work

• Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
• Dynamic predicate logic
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