Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.003zbMath1202.91026OpenAlexW2141441486MaRDI QIDQ848605

Satoru Takahashi

Publication date: 4 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamebelief-free equilibriumrandom matchingcommunity enforcementfirst-order information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (22)

Social learning and the shadow of the past ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game ⋮ HELPING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE SOCIETIES ⋮ Independent random matching ⋮ Community enforcement with observation costs ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity ⋮ Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity ⋮ Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history ⋮ Community enforcement using modal actions ⋮ ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* ⋮ On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Stag hunt with unknown outside options ⋮ Observability of partners' past play and cooperation: experimental evidence ⋮ Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents ⋮ Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy ⋮ Fiat money as a public signal, medium of exchange, and punishment ⋮ Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money

Cites Work

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• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Existence of independent random matching
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Sequential Equilibria
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• On Modes of Economic Governance
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

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