When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002zbMath1202.91025OpenAlexW2079771759MaRDI QIDQ848606

Johannes Hörner, Olivier Gossner

Publication date: 4 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

entropysignalsrepeated gameconditional independencefolk theoremindividually rational payoffminmax payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

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