Two-sided matching with interdependent values
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Publication:848607
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004zbMath1202.91234OpenAlexW2097909533MaRDI QIDQ848607
Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky
Publication date: 4 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
Related Items (19)
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Decision-making with reference information ⋮ On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information ⋮ A dynamic school choice model ⋮ Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets ⋮ Group robust stability in matching markets ⋮ Group stability in matching with interdependent values ⋮ The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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