Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.005zbMath1202.91143OpenAlexW3123206349MaRDI QIDQ848613

Mark Schroder, Naveen Khanna

Publication date: 4 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationpredationcontract theorydebt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (1)

Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Convex Programming and Duality in Normed Space

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