On the relative strengths of altruism and fairness

DOI10.1007/S11238-005-4752-0zbMath1098.91031OpenAlexW2022727588MaRDI QIDQ850471

Jonathan H. W. Tan, Friedel Bolle

Publication date: 3 November 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-4752-0

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessdictator gamealtruismsocial welfaretransfer rate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Competing allocation principles: time for compromise? ⋮ Parameters of social preference functions: measurement and external validity ⋮ Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game ⋮ INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Cites Work

• Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Distributional concerns: Equity- or efficiency-oriented?

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