A characterization of stochastically stable networks

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0024-7zbMath1110.90013OpenAlexW3125130462MaRDI QIDQ850886

Olivier Tercieux, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 7 November 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73945

zbMATH Keywords

Stochastic stabilityNetwork formationPairwise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Related Items

Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks, Determinants of equilibrium selection in network formation: an experiment, Evolution of social networks, A dynamic analysis of collusive networks, Farsightedly stable networks

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